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is substantially similar interlock, regardless of their comparative
reliability, is antithetical to that end.
Etty Menache Pollack

PENAL LAW

Penal Law § 265.02(4): Criminal possession of a weapon in the
third degree-defendant bears burden of production as to "home
or place of business" exception
Under section 265.02(4) of the Penal Law,1 a person possessing
a loaded firearm is guilty of a class D felony, unless "such possession takes place in such person's home or place of business."2 New
York courts have held that the home or place of business exception
I N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02 (McKinney 1980). Section 265.02 provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree when:
(4) He possesses any loaded firearm. Such possession shall not. . . constitute
a violation of this section if such possession, takes place in such person's home or
place of business.
Criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree is a class D felony.
Id.. Mere possession of a firearm, regardless of whether it is loaded or where it is possessed
is a class A misdemeanor. See § 265.01(1) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
2 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02(4) (McKinney 1980). The exception for possession of a
loaded firearm in one's home or place of business reflects a conscious effort to balance society's need to restrict illegal weapons and the individual's need to protect himself and his
property. See People v. Rondon, 109 Misc. 2d 394, 395, 439 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1981); People v. McWilliams, 96 Misc. 2d 648, 651, 653-54, 409 N.Y.S.2d 610, 612,
614 (Nassau County Ct. 1978). Courts have generally applied the place of business exception
when a defendant's personal property interests are at stake. See, e.g., People v. Santana, 77
Misc. 2d 414, 415, 354 N.Y.S.2d 387, 389 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Queens County 1974) (taxicab is
driver's place of business); People v. Anderson, 74 Misc. 2d 415, 419, 344 N.Y.S.2d 15, 19
(N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx County 1973) (same). But see People v. Levine, 42 App. Div. 2d
769, 769, 346 N.Y.S.2d 756, 756 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.) (exception inapplicable when taxidriver unnecessarily brandished loaded gun in argument with another motorist).
Courts will not apply the place of business exception if possession of the weapon is
incidental or irrelevant to legitimate protection of property. See, e.g., People v. Fearon, 58
App. Div. 2d 1041, 1041, 397 N.Y.S.2d 294, 294 (4th Dep't 1977) (mem.) (where defendant
shot co-worker, exception did not apply merely because shooting occurred at place of emplpyment), People v. Francis, 45 App. Div. 2d 431, 434, 358 N.Y.S.2d 148, 152 (2d Dep't
1974) (United States postal worker could not take advantage of exception where he was not
required by his superiors to protect government property), aff'd on other grounds, 38
N.Y.2d 150, 341 N.E.2d 540, 379 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1975); People v. Rondon, 109 Misc. 2d 394,
399, 439 N.Y.S.2d 803, 808 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981) (director of not-for-profit corporation does not fall within exception unless authorized by corporate employer to carry
weapon).
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is an element of the crime,3 which must be pleaded and upon
which the People have the ultimate burden of proof.4 Recently,
however, in People v. Rodriguez,5 the Appellate Division, Second
Department, held that the prosecution need not prove this element
to support a conviction unless the defendant first produces some
credible evidence to raise the issue.8
The defendant in Rodriguez had been arrested in a public
laundromat in Brooklyn while attempting to hide a loaded handgun.' He was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the
third degree at a bench trial approximately six years later.' At
trial, neither party presented any evidence as to whether the laundromat in which the defendant had been arrested was his place of
business.9 The defendant appealed, claiming that the prosecution
3 See, e.g., People v. Newell, 95 App. Div. 2d 815, 816, 463 N.Y.S.2d 538, 539 (2d Dep't
1983) (mem.); People v. Meyer, 46 App. Div. 2d 904, 904, 362 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191 (2d Dep't
1974) (mem.); cf. People v. McWilliams, 96 Misc. 2d 648, 656, 409 N.Y.S.2d 610, 615 (Nassau County Ct. 1978) (indictment which did allege "not in home or place of business" was
defective where issue was not presented to Grand Jury). But see United States ex rel.
Presenzano v. Deegan, 294 F. Supp. 1347, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (by indicting for possession
of weapon "as a felony," prosecution implicitly negatived home or place of business
exception).
The determination of whether a statutory exception to an offense is treated as an element of the crime or as a defense generally turns on the proximity of the exception to the
clause defining the offense. Where an exception is defined in the same clause as the crime,
the inapplicability of that exception is usually found to be an element which must be
pleaded and proved in every case by the prosecution. See People v. Kohut, 30 N.Y.2d 183,
187, 282 N.E.2d 312, 314-15, 331 N.Y.S.2d 416, 420 (1972); People v. Meyer, 46 App. Div. 2d
904, 904, 362 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191 (2d Dep't 1974) (mem.); 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §
20 (C. Torcia 13th ed. 1972). An exception created subsequently in the statute or in a different statute is generally called a "proviso" and treated as a defense which the prosecution
need neither plead nor disprove to establish a prima facie case against the defendant. See,
e.g., Kohut, 30 N.Y.2d at 187, 282 N.E.2d at 315, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 420 (defense of statute of
limitations in Penal Law); People v. Baur, 102 Misc. 2d 971, 972, 423 N.Y.S.2d 800, 801
(Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1980) (exception to speed limit law for emergency vehicles in Vehicle & Traffic Law); People v. Kollender, 69 Misc. 995, 1009-10, 10 N.Y.S.2d 252, 255 (Nassau County Ct. 1939) (zoning ordinance with subsequent proviso preserving legality of prior
non-conforming use).
" See 3 CJI, PL 265.02(4) (People must prove beyond reasonable doubt defendant not
within home or place of business). CPL § 70.20 provides:
No conviction of an offense by verdict is valid unless based upon trial evidence
which is legally sufficient and which establishes beyond a reasonable doubt every
element of such offense and the defendant's commission thereof.
CPL § 70.20 (McKinney 1981).
113 App. Div. 2d 337, 496 N.Y.S.2d 448 (2d Dep't 1985).
C Id. at 338, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
7Id.
B Id. at 339, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
o Id.
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had failed to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 10 The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant bears the burden
of production as to whether he falls into the "home or place of
business" exception of section 265.02(4)."
Writing for the court, Justice Eiber noted New York's strong
policy against handguns 12 and the personal nature of the evidence
which would relate to the statutory exceptionJ3 The court recognized that the exception is an element of the crime which the People must plead, and that the burden of proof rests ultimately on
the prosecution.' 4 Justice Eiber reasoned, however, that since the
defendant's access to such knowledge is unrestricted, "fairness and
10Id.
" See id. at 342, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
" See id. at 340, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 449-50. See generally, Governor's Memorandum on
Approval of chs. 233 and 234, N.Y. LAWS (June 13, 1980), reprinted in [1980] N.Y. LAWS
1857 (McKinney) (New York has "the toughest gun law in the country.... ").
13 113 App. Div. at 340, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 450. Justice Eiber reasoned that since the facts
which would make the exception applicable "are primarily within the defendant's knowledge," id., the People may be unaware that the exception is at issue in any particular case.
Id. Therefore, it is reasonable to require the defendant to come forward with some credible
evidence to alert the prosecution that this exception is germane to the case. Id. This rationale has been held to apply to a claim of good cause for failure to honor a subpoena, see
People v. D'Amato, 12 App. Div. 2d 439, 440-41, 211 N.Y.S.2d 877, 878 (1st Dep't 1971), and
proof of licensure, see People v. Bradford, 227 N.Y. 45, 47-48, 124 N.E. 118, 119-20 (1919).
See also People v. Kibler, 106 N.Y. 321, 324, 12 N.E. 795, 796 (1887) (in prosecution for
selling adulterated milk, defendant's claim that he came within exception for selling
skimmed milk related to facts peculiarly within his knowledge, disproof of which was not
necessary to People's prima facie case).
The Rodriguez court further supported its holding by quoting at length from People u.
Rosa, 65 N.Y.2d 380, 386-87, 482 N.E.2d 21, 25-26, 492 N.Y.S.2d 542, 546-47 (1985). In
Rosa, the defendant made a motion to suppress evidence, claiming that the prosecution
failed to disprove that he was represented by counsel on another charge, although he was
interrogated without the presence of such counsel. Id. at 382-83, 482 N.E.2d at 23-24, 492
N.Y.S.2d at 544. The Court of Appeals held that it would be extraordinarily difficult for the
People to prove that the defendant was nowhere represented by counsel. "[Placing the
burden of proof on the defendant in numerous contexts collateral to the question of guilt
has long been upheld." Id. at 387, 482 N.E.2d at 26, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 547 (citations omitted).
It is submitted that the Rodriguez court erred in its reliance on Rosa, because the Rosa
holding was limited to "contexts collateral to the question of guilt," while the exception
promulgated by section 265.02(4) is not collateral to the defendant's guilt but is an element
essential to the offense. Moreover, it is suggested that the facts necessary to establish
whether the section 265.02(4) exception applies are not as difficult to prove as the claim of
representation by counsel which was at issue in Rosa. See infra notes 18 and 32 and accompanying text.
,4113 App. Div. 2d at 340, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 450. The indictment alleged that Rodriguez
did not possess the weapon in his home or place of business and was therefore legally sufficient. Id. at 340 n.1, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 450 n.1.

19861

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

common sense dictate that the initial burden of production .. .
should be placed on the defense. ..

.,,

Justice Lazer dissented, arguing that by placing the burden of
coming forward to negative an acknowledged element of the crime
on the defendant, the court had unjustifiably rejected the normal
presumption of innocence in criminal trials.16 Although the burden
of coming forward has been placed on a criminal defendant in situations where the relevant information is uniquely within his possession, Justice Lazer contended that the comprehensive provisions17
for defenses and affirmative defenses in the New York Penal Law
obviate the need for such an analysis when applied to the elements
of a crime.18
It is submitted that the Rodriguez court's holding will serve to
relieve prosecutors of their burden of proof by requiring defense
counsel to alert the People that the home or place of business exception will be asserted.' 9 No longer will the defendant be able to
rely on the prosecutor's failure to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; the accused must, rather, treat
the home or place of business element as a defense, raising it if he
" Id. at 342, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 451. Justice Eiber cited three cases which have indicated
that the defendant bears the burden of production on the home or place of business exception of section 265.02(4): People v. Witherspoon, 120 Misc. 2d 648, 653, 466 N.Y.S.2d 611,
614-15 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1983); People v. McWilliams, 96 Misc. 2d 648, 655, 409
N.Y.S.2d 610, 615 (Nassau County Ct. 1978) and United States ex rel. Presenzano v. Deegan, 294 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (1969). See Rodriguez, 113 App. Div.2d at 342, 496 N.Y.S.2d at
451.
16See 113 App. Div. 2d at 344, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 453 (Lazer, J.P., dissenting). Justice
Lazer asserted that the effect of the holding "transforms an element the People were obligated to prove in all cases into a defense for which the defendant has the burden of going
forward before the People must shoulder their burden." Id.
17 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 25.00 (McKinney 1980); infra note 23.
18 113 App. Div. 2d at 345, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 453-54 (Lazer, J.P., dissenting). Since the

Legislature did not define the home or place of business exception as a defense, Justice
Lazer argued that the court ignored the Legislature's intent by employing a burden-shifting
device by which the "People may obtain a felony conviction under section 265.02(4) by
merely establishing facts sufficient to support a misdemeanor conviction under section
265.01(1). 113 App. Div. 2d at 346, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 454 (Lazer, J.P., dissenting).
In addition, Justice Lazer noted that the three cases relied upon by the court were all
decided on other grounds, and merely stated in dicta that the burden of production is on
the defendant. Id. Finally, as for the court's reliance on People v. Rosa, 65 N.Y.2d 380, 482
N.E.2d 21, 492 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1985), Justice Lazer claimed such reliance was misplaced,
since the case at bar did not involve an issue collateral to guilt, but rather "a material
element of a crime to be pleaded and proven by the People in every case and not classified
as a defense." 113 App. Div. 2d at 346-47, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 454 (Lazer, J.P., dissenting).
1 See 113 App. Div. 2d at 343, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
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does not wish to lose its protection. 20
It is suggested, moreover, that by shifting the burden of coming forward to the defendant, the Rodriguez court disregarded the
constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the prosecution
in a criminal case to prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.21 The home or place of business exception of section 265.02(4) is an element of the crime,22 not a defense
or an affirmative defense.2 It is urged that a court may not shift
the burden of production to the defendant and treat it as such.24
Although the prosecutor may sometimes have the benefit of a
presumption to establish proof of an element, such a presumption
can arise only when there is a "reasonably high degree of
probability" that the presumed fact will follow from the facts
proven.25 It is urged that mere proof of the defendant's possession
20 See id. at 344-45, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 453 (Lazer, J.P., dissenting). "[Wihere a defense

serves to negate an element, the defendant cannot, as a practical matter, be made to bear

the burden of production." P. RoBINsoN,

CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES,

§ 4(a)(2) (1984).

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In Winship, the United States Supreme
Court "explicitly [held] that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged." Id. Although a state may define affirmative defenses on which
the defendant bears the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence, see Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205-07 (1977), a defendant cannot be required to offer
proof to refute an element of a crime. See id. at 215.
22 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
23 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 25.00 (McKinney 1980). Every defense is defined under the
Penal Law and has been labelled either an ordinary defense or an affirmative defense. See
id.; New York State Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code: Staff
Comments on Changes in the new Penal Law since the 1964 Study Bill, art. 25 [1965],
reprinted in [1974] GILBERT'S CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 2A-120; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 25,
commentary at 62 (McKinney 1975); J. Za-r, NEW YORK CRIMINAL PRACTICE § 63.1[2] at 6364.
24 Compare CPL § 70.20 (every element must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt)
with N.Y. PENAL LAW § 25.00 (McKinney 1975) (defense, once raised, must be disproven
beyond a reasonable doubt).
25 People v. Leyva, 38 N.Y.2d 160, 166, 341 N.E.2d 546, 550-51, 379 N.Y.S.2d 30, 35
(1975). In defining presumptions, the Legislature may base its judgment on common sense
and experience. See id. (presumption that all occupants of automobile knew of drugs carried
within, declared constitutional); People v. McCaleb, 25 N.Y.2d 394, 404, 255 N.E.2d 136,
141, 306 N.Y.S.2d 889, 897, (1969) (in prosecution for joyriding, where no permission was
given by owner, it may be presumed defendant knew he had no permission); People v.
Robinson, 97 Misc. 2d 47, 54-55, 411 N.Y.S.2d 793, 797-98 (Sup. Ct. Crim. Term Kings
County 1978) (where utility lines were tampered with to effect theft of services, knowledge
of each tampering may rationally be imputed to recipient of such services).
The United States Supreme Court has applied a somewhat more relaxed standard with
regard to presumptions. See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, '142 U.S. 140, 165
2
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of an illegal firearm in a public laundromat cannot logically lead to
the conclusion that the laundromat was not the defendant's place
of business; 26 hence, no such presumption may arise. In addition,
the Penal Law establishes comprehensive defenses and statutory
presumptions relating to specific offenses.2 7 The fact that the exception in section 265.02(4) is not among these suggests that the
legislature did not intend it to be considered a defense or
28
presumption.
Notwithstanding the constitutionality of requiring a defendant
to come forward to refute an element of a crime where the evidence is peculiarly within his knowledge, 29 it is submitted that
such an approach was inappropriate in Rodriguez. The burden of
production has historically been placed on the defendant only in
such limited circumstances that requiring the People to prove the
element would be overly burdensome."0 Neither the fact that the
(1979); Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6,
36 (1969). The constitutional standard for a presumption to be valid is that the presumed
fact must be "more likely than not" to occur because of the existence of the proven facts.
Compare, Barnes, 412 U.S. at 845-46 (common law presumption of knowledge from possession of stolen goods constitutional) with Leary, 395 U.S. at 37-38 (presumption of knowledge of importation from possession of marijuana unconstitutional) and Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463, 468 (1943) (presumption from possession of gun by felon that it was
acquired through interstate commerce after certain date unconstitutional).
26 See 113 App. Div. 2d at 348, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 455 (Laser, J.P., dissenting). The Rodriguez court, while applauding the standard expressed in People v. Witherspoon, 120 Misc.
2d 648, 653, 466 N.Y.S.2d 611, 614-15 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1983), rejected the rebuttable
presumption analysis set forth therein. Id. at 343, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 452. Common experience
does not teach that a person's presence in a public laundromat proves he does not work
therein. Cf. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 468 (1943) (presumption from fact that felon
possessed gun that such gun was acquired through interstate commerce after a certain date
held irrational and therefore unconstitutional).
27 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15 (McKinney 1975) (presumptions relating to illegal
weapons), id at §§ 25.00-40.10 (defenses generally applicable).
28 See 113 App. Div. 2d at 346, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 454 (Lazer, J.P., dissenting); supra note
18.
28 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (discussion of constitutionality of
shifting burden to defendant).
30 See People v. Kollender, 169 Misc. 995, 1004, 10 N.Y.S.2d 252, 260 (Nassau County
Ct. 1939) ("this exception is almost always applied in cases where a course of conduct is
prohibited unless it be licensed.
...). Other situations where the defendant may have the
burden of coming forward include bigamy (claim that first marriage is invalid), age (claim
that defendant is a minor), and assault with a gun (claim that gun was not loaded). See 1
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 14 (C. Torcia 13th ed. 1972).
The term "peculiarly within the knowledge" is generally construed as meaning almost
exclusively within the defendant's control or knowledge, see People v. Bradford, 227 N.Y.
45, 48, 124 N.E. 118, 118-19 (1919) (defendant has possession of hunting license); 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 20 (C. Torcia 13th ed. 1972), or incapable of direct proof by the
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defendant clearly has the relevant knowledge, or access thereto,
nor the fact that it is more convenient for the defendant than the
prosecutor to produce such knowledge, is enough to shift the burden to the defendant. 3 1 Since the prosecutor must know where a
defendant charged under section 265.02(4) was arrested,3 2 it is suggested that proving the character of such location with respect to
the defendant does not present any special difficulty which justifies
shifting the burden of production to the defendant.3
The Rodriguez holding may set a dangerous precedent. While
courts certainly should interpret the law with respect to the legislative intent to limit handguns, they must not do so at the expense
of due process. It is submitted that the prosecutor's failure to
prove an element of the crime ought to have been fatal to his case,
and that the court violated Rodriguez's constitutionally mandated
presumption of innocence by holding otherwise.
Glenn M. Mitchell
Addendum: As this article was going to press, People v. Rodriguez
was reversed. In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals
adopted Justice Lazer's Appellate Division dissent, 68 N.Y.2d 674,
496 N.E.2d 682, 505 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1986), thus preserving the home
or place of business exception as an element of Section 265.02(4).
Defendants may, therefore, continue to rely on the constitutional
prosecution. See People v. Rosa, 65 N.Y.2d 380, 386, 482 N.E.2d 21, 25, 492 N.Y.S.2d 542,
546 (1985) (People would have to prove that defendant was nowhere represented by counsel); People v. D'Amato, 12 App. Div. 2d 439, 445, 211 N.Y.S.2d 877, 882 (1st Dep't 1961)
(intolerable burden for prosecution to negative every possible excuse constituting good cause
for failure to appear when subpoenaed).
31 See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943).
[T]he fact that the defendant has the better means of information [can not],
standing alone, justify [shifting the burden of proof]. In every criminal case the
defendant has at least an equal familiarity with the facts and in most [cases] a
greater familiarity with them than the prosecution. It might, therefore, be argued
that to place upon all defendants in criminal cases the burden of going forward
with the evidence would be proper. But the argument proves too much.
Id.
32 To prove commission of a crime, the prosecutor must present evidence to identify the
defendant as the perpetrator, see 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 16 (C. Torcia 13th ed.
1972), and therefore it is submitted that information regarding the knowledge of where the
defendant possessed the gun would clearly be within the People's reach.
11 Such proof does not require establishing a negative incapable of direct proof, as in
Rosa or D'Amato. The prosecutor must simply show that one particular site, that of defendant's arrest, was neither lived at nor worked at by the defendant.
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requirement that the prosecutor prove each and every element of
the offense in every case to sustain a conviction.

